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Abstract
Private equity firms are accused by trade unions of changing industrial relations in buyouts by 
demonstrating an unwillingness to recognize and work with trade unions, and by downgrading 
information and consultation. To explore these important policy issues, this article reports the 
first representative pan-European survey of managers’ perceptions of the impact of private equity 
on industrial relations. Managers report that private equity investment does not result in changes 
to union recognition, membership density or changes in management attitudes to trade union 
membership. Furthermore, managers in firms recognizing unions after private equity buyouts do 
not report reductions in the terms and conditions subject to joint regulation. Under private 
equity ownership more firms report consultative committees, managers regard these as more 
influential on their decisions, and indicate increased consultation over firm performance and 
future plans. Comparing industrial relations changes in different social models in Europe, the 
results suggest private equity firms adapt to national systems and traditional national industrial 
relations differences persist after buyout.
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Introduction
Considerable debate has emerged over the past few years concerning the implications of 
private equity buyouts, where private equity investors and often a management team pool 
their own money (together with debt finance) to buy shares in that company from its cur-
rent owners, and re-sell them after a certain time to distribute the divestment gains to their 
investors (Gilligan and Wright, 2008). Private equity has attracted increased attention 
because the European buyout market has grown significantly over the previous two 
decades to €171 billion in 2007, and 96 percent of buyouts by value in 2007 had private 
equity investment (CMBOR, 2008). We use the term ‘buyout’ throughout this article as a 
generic term covering both insider driven management buyouts and outsider driven man-
agement buy-ins, but excluding early stage venture capital investments. Reflecting the 
increased importance of private equity, inquiries into the potentially negative effects of 
highly leveraged deals have been conducted by the International Monetary Fund, the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2007), the European 
Central Bank (2007) and the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA, 2006). International 
trade union leaders have also criticized private equity, regarding it as an important factor 
extending the shareholder value model of corporate governance, notably through extend-
ing this model from listed to private companies (Evans and Habbard, 2008). As such, 
private equity is not just an Anglo-American phenomenon but part of global develop-
ments in financial markets (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2008; Wright et al., 2007).
In exporting Anglo-American financial practices into Continental Europe, the indus-
trial relations implications of private equity ownership have attracted specific interest, 
with private equity regarded as a direct threat to the European social model of worker 
participation (Vitols, 2008). Debates have ranged from public hearings to proposed leg-
islative reform in the European Parliament, the German Bundestag and UK House of 
Commons (Evans and Habbard, 2008). In these debates private equity firms are accused 
of delivering improved performance at the expense of workers’ terms and conditions; 
seeking to reduce employment costs, downgrading working conditions and threatening 
jobs (IUF, 2007; PSE Group in European Parliament, 2007; TUC, 2007). Trade unions 
argue that private equity firms seek to withdraw from joint regulation in order to reduce 
workers’ terms and conditions. For example, managers derecognizing the GMB trade 
union in 2005 following the UK’s AA buyout, is cited as a typical case of private equity 
investor behaviour to raise profits.
Private equity is regarded as part of the Anglo-American model of shareholder value 
opposed by socialists in Europe (Hans-Bockler-Stiftung, 2007). The International Trade 
Union Confederation (ITUC, 2007) accuses private equity firms of a similar ‘refusal to 
engage in collective bargaining and outright harassment of workers who organise in 
trade unions’.
For these reasons unions made a coordinated attempt to press the Group of Eight in 
2007 for action on private equity involving regulatory reforms to cover ‘workers’ rights 
to collective bargaining, information, consultation and representation within the firm’ 
(TUAC, 2007). European trade union leaders continue to press for increased EU 
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regulation providing for enhanced information, consultation and dialogue with workers 
and unions in private equity buyouts. Following the European Parliament’s endorsement 
of Rasmussen’s critical report into private equity and hedge funds, and the European 
Commission’s (EC) high level consultation on the issue in February 2009, the EC pro-
posed a Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers in April 2009, to be discussed 
in the European Parliament and Council with a view to implementing the directive by 
2011. The Directive has been criticized by the Party of European Socialists (PES) as inad-
equate and the private equity industry as imposing unnecessary costs and red tape. It is 
therefore essential to ensure the proposed Directive is assessed in the light of the best avail-
able evidence, especially given the costs it would impose on portfolio companies, reducing 
the funds available for the private equity industry to acquire and help turnaround troubled 
firms in the recession, and advantaging other firms who may seek to acquire failing com-
petitors yet may be less effective at turning around troubled companies.
Much of this debate is based on frequently mentioned isolated examples. At least 
some of these firms would have closed or experienced job losses without private equity 
involvement, and following buyouts some have increased employee ownership (Work 
Foundation, 2007) and employment (Milne, 2008). Recent arguments of critics also con-
trast with previous evidence that the first wave of UK buyouts made few changes to trade 
union representation (Bacon et al., 2004; Wright et al., 1984, 1990, 2009). It is also evi-
dent that many private equity backed buyouts exploit growth and entrepreneurial oppor-
tunities rather than concentrating only on reducing costs (Meuleman et al., 2009; Wright 
and Coyne, 1985; Wright et al., 2000). More is required than the limited evidence avail-
able on recent developments before greater regulation could be justified and assumed to 
have any significant impact (Watt, 2008).
There is now extensive evidence on the impact of private equity buyouts on employ-
ment and wages based on archival data, showing that an initial decline in employment is 
followed by subsequent increases (Cressy et al., 2007; Davis et al., 2008), especially in 
insider driven management buyouts (MBOs) (Amess and Wright, 2007a). Traditional 
corporate acquisitions have a significantly greater negative impact on employment than 
private equity backed deals (Amess et al., 2008), and increasing the regulative burden to 
disadvantage private equity firms may have negative unintended consequences for 
employment in troubled firms undergoing traditional corporate acquisition.
This article extends previous work by providing the first systematic study of manag-
ers’ perceptions of the impact of private equity on industrial relations across Europe. We 
focus on evidence relating to claims that private equity has ‘negative impacts on work-
ers’ representation at the workplace, on information and consultation rights and collec-
tive bargaining more generally’ (Watt, 2008: 557). The specific aims of the article are 
therefore twofold: first, to provide an analysis of the impact of private equity and buy-
outs on industrial relations in Europe; and second, to evaluate whether any industrial 
relations changes vary according to different social models in Europe. The article reports 
the findings from a pan-European survey of managers’ perceptions conducted in 2008 
and which involved a representative sample of 190 European private equity backed 
buyouts.
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Private equity buyouts and industrial relations
From an agency theory perspective, private equity backed buyouts use incentives to 
realign the interests of owners and managers, encouraging managers to reduce all unnec-
essary costs, and avoid investment in wasteful low-benefit or value-destroying activities. 
Tighter financial monitoring makes managers potentially more accountable to private 
equity investors. The commitment to service the debt taken on at the time of the buyout 
pressurizes managers to reduce expenditure, improve operational efficiencies and elimi-
nate unprofitable operations, while managerial equity ownership provides incentives to 
reduce costs (Jensen, 1986). Employees are thought to benefit from more secure jobs and 
possibly increased employment resulting from reduced agency costs, improved strategic 
and operational capabilities, and hence more viable businesses. Indeed, many buyouts 
involve business growth (Meuleman et al., 2009) and the average length of investment is 
around five years and increasing (Stromberg, 2008; Wright et al., 2007).
However, unions argue that operational efficiencies are achieved at workers’ expense, 
expressing concerns about the industrial relations implications and the process of private 
equity buyouts. The first concern relates to union fears that private equity ownership 
results in their reduced role in consultation and negotiation. According to the ITUC, pri-
vate equity firms have short-term aims for buyouts with ‘no need for employer-employee 
partnerships’ (ITUC, 2007: 8), and private equity ownership ‘generally includes pressure 
on wages, benefits and working conditions; refusal to engage in collective bargaining; and 
outright harassment of workers who organise in trade unions’ (p. 5). Even in Germany, 
with an extensive system of co-determination, works councils report ‘frostier’ relations 
with management under private equity ownership (PSE, 2007: 10). In extremis, this may 
involve ‘grand-scale union busting’ as part of a general management antagonism towards 
unions (ITUC, 2007). To support these claims, the ITUC (2007) points to evidence from 
the Centre for Management Buy-out Research (CMBOR) of slight declines in union 
recognition in UK and Dutch buyouts (Bruining et al., 2005), managers in buyouts with 
negative views towards unions (Bacon et al., 2004), and after reviewing this evidence the 
Work Foundation concludes ‘the combination of a pre-existing hostility to trade unions 
and the fall in recognition of a union after a buyout would imply that derecognition was 
. . . one motive for going down the private equity route’ (Work Foundation, 2007: 26).
Further, John Monks, General Secretary of the European Trade Union Confederation 
claims that ‘established companies (with consensual industrial relations systems) are 
destroyed’ by private equity firms who take them over, because these firms ‘are much 
readier to challenge existing norms, procedures and structures, especially those relating 
to workers, unions and works councils’ (Monks, 2006). Where negotiations occur trade 
unions feel that private equity investors will be less willing to be influenced. The PES 
has therefore called for ‘workers rights to collective bargaining, information and consul-
tation to be guaranteed by private equities before a take over’ (PES Council Adopted 
Resolution, 2007). However, closer reading behind public statements shows trade unions 
recognize that classifying all private equity companies as good or bad is not easy because 
they pursue a range of strategies including growth-orientated and longer-term investment 
strategies (Muller, 2006). The EC’s proposed Directive on Alternative Investment Fund 
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Managers (2009) nevertheless requires annual disclosure of information on fund invest-
ment strategy and objectives to employee representatives in portfolio companies.
The second issue raised by unions concerns the process of private equity buyouts. In 
effecting buyouts from often diffuse and distant owners of publicly listed corporations or 
divisions of such firms, private equity firms reduce the gap between owners and manag-
ers and are more active investors (Jensen, 1986). Nevertheless, unions argue that finan-
cial investors do not inform employee representatives before a takeover and as a result ‘it 
is very difficult for works councillors and trade unionists to assess the strategy of a 
potential buyer’ (Muller, 2006: 2). The EC’s proposed Directive on Alternative Investment 
Fund Managers (2009) therefore requires the disclosure of information on fund invest-
ment strategy and objectives to employee representatives when acquiring control of port-
folio companies. Unions also claim that private equity buyouts leave workers ‘to face 
invisible employers that show no interest in dealing with their trade union representatives 
or informing them of what is happening to their workplaces’ (ITUC, 2007: 8). They 
express specific concerns over this ‘vanishing employer’ (Watt, 2008: 561), whereby 
unions only deal with managers rather than private equity investors during the buyout, 
and unions assume investors make the most significant decisions. As a result, unions 
have demanded stronger participation rights for employee representatives during take-
overs and acquisitions (ITUC, 2007).
The ITUC calls for greater regulation giving union representatives rights to informa-
tion on the business plans of private equity bidders and involvement in the buyout (ITUC, 
2007). It also calls for private equity investors not to change terms and conditions with-
out collective agreements, respect worker’s rights to organize, and ensure that these 
assurances continue after future sale of the business. In adopting Rasmussen’s report on 
private equity and hedge funds, the European Parliament backed the proposal to extend 
the Directive obliging employees to be informed and consulted during takeovers to 
include leveraged buyouts. It is further suggested in the event of the sale of company 
assets ‘connected to a repayment of the acquisition debt, the employees of the target 
company should be informed and consulted, through the workers’ council when there is 
one’ (Rasmussen, 2009: 9). To shed more light on this issue, we first evaluate further the 
extent of consultation and negotiation that occurs with employee representatives before 
buyout announcements.
Although unions in different countries report that private equity buyouts result in the 
downgrading of worker representation and social dialogue (Böttger, 2006; Watt, 2008), 
national differences in employment legislation across Europe may produce different out-
comes from changes in ownership. The impact of private equity on industrial relations 
may therefore be path dependent in line with the varieties of capitalism (VoC) perspec-
tive (Hall and Soskice, 2001). More recent VoC literature allows for firms to experiment 
and adjust within institutional contexts. Hall and Thelen (2008) note that reforms of 
corporate governance often labelled liberalization do not necessarily ‘dictate changes in 
labour relations’ (p. 17), although ‘more dramatic changes’ in corporate governance and 
finance may undermine coordinated market economies (p. 18). Unless private equity 
firms are part of this dramatic change, they may be expected to work with unions in 
European countries with stronger codetermination legislation, whereas they may operate 
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relatively free of union constraints in countries with more permissive worker representa-
tion legislation. However, research on buyouts in both the UK and The Netherlands, the 
latter having a higher degree of employment protection, reported the positive effects of 
buyouts on employment practices are surprisingly greater in the less regulated UK con-
text than in The Netherlands (Bruining et al., 2005). Watt (2008: 562) suggests private 
equity is probably “‘unideological’’, if unsentimental, in its approach to issues such as 
collective bargaining and worker participation’, unless urgent restructuring is required 
and opposed by unions. It is therefore important to understand more about the industrial 
relations impact of private equity buyouts in different social models across Europe. Watt 
(2008) suggests three possible scenarios: private equity may have more negative effects 
in European countries with stronger codetermination as it is necessary to overcome union 
representatives in order to reduce employment costs; private equity firms may force 
convergence towards Anglo-American industrial relations; or private equity firms may 
adapt to national systems and traditional national industrial relations differences persist. 
The second aim is therefore to evaluate whether the private equity impact on industrial 
relations varies according to different social models in Europe.
Research method
The findings are based on a questionnaire survey conducted in the first half of 2008 com-
prising responses from 190 private equity backed buyouts across Europe completed 
between 2002 and 2006, and face-to-face interviews with 16 managers of buyout compa-
nies. Unlike employment and wage data that are reported in firms’ accounts, representa-
tive industrial relations data need to be gathered through surveys. Our sample was derived 
from the Centre for Management Buy-out Research (CMBOR) database, which contains 
details of the entire population of European buyouts. To identify deals, a twice-yearly 
survey of all private equity firms, intermediaries and banks active in the buyout market is 
conducted; respondents receive a free report analysing market trends. Press, annual cor-
porate reports, and stock exchange circulars are used to gather additional data. The dataset 
has no upper or lower size limit and includes both publicly declared buyouts as well as 
confidential deals. The time frame of 2002–6 was selected to allow time for post-buyout 
changes to take place, to be not too distant in the past, to avoid recall bias and to cover the 
period of the recent wave of private equity buyouts. The time period elapsed since the 
buyouts and the survey allowed for changes in industrial relations to emerge.
The questionnaire was translated into French, Spanish, German and Italian and sent to 
companies with more than 50 employees identified using the CMBOR database. The 
CEO, or HR Director, was contacted either by email (when possible) or by post. 
Reminders were sent after two weeks. Some 190 companies replied out of 2597 con-
tacted; a response rate of 7.3 percent. Response rates to mail questionnaire surveys are 
generally falling. This response is in line with others involving pan-European studies of 
managers’ perceptions (Scholes et al., 2007, find a 7% response rate in a sample of 
European family firm buyouts; Lockett et al., 2008, obtain a 10% response rate for a 
sample of venture capital backed exporters in Europe).
Most respondents were at least at director level (88%), with the remainder senior 
managers, indicating a close familiarity with the issues covered by the survey. Although 
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using multiple respondents from the same firm may reduce response error, using scarce 
research resources on finding multiple informed raters reduces sample size and we there-
fore concentrated on key informants and a larger sample size (Kumar et al., 1993). Union 
representatives may have different views of events and we do not know whether they 
would report an increased or decreased bargaining role. However, many private equity 
backed deals are not unionized and independent employee representatives would be dif-
ficult to locate. The findings are therefore limited by dependence upon the perceptions of 
managers involved in these activities, although such views are of intrinsic interest.
The main characteristics of the surveyed companies were compared with the popula-
tion of European buyouts in the CMBOR database to assess the validity of the results. 
The representative nature of the sample was assessed on the basis of several criteria: 
country of location, industrial sector, deal size, and whether the business had been profit-
able or loss making at the time of the buyout. The sample has a good fit with the popula-
tion across countries with two exceptions: French companies are under-represented, 
while British companies are, to a lesser extent, over-represented (Table 1). This reflects 
well-known differences in response rates to survey instruments across Europe (Bygrave 
et al., 1994). The sample is representative with the population in terms of industrial sec-
tors. Industrial products and consumer related are slightly over-represented in the sam-
ple, while services are a little under-represented. In terms of deal transaction value, the 
sample comprised a higher proportion of large buyouts and a lower share of the smallest 
buyouts compared with the population. When comparing the average number of sample 
employees with the population of buyout firms on the CMBOR database, the sample 
contained slightly more large firms and slightly fewer medium-sized firms. The sample 
also showed a slight under representation of poor performers. The distribution of buyouts 
and buy-ins in the sample and population are very similar.
Table 1 Questionnaire responses by country 
Country Population No. Population % Sample No. Sample %
Austria 25 1.0 3 1.6
Belgium 58 2.2 5 2.6
Denmark 55 2.1 3 1.6
Finland 64 2.5 2 1.1
France 471 18.1 17 8.9
Germany 312 12.0 20 10.5
Greece 1 0.0 0 0.0
Ireland 17 0.7 2 1.1
Italy 144 5.5 14 7.4
Netherlands 167 6.4 14 7.4
Norway 43 1.7 5 2.6
Portugal 11 0.4 1 0.5
Spain 123 4.7 6 3.2
Sweden 104 4.0 11 5.8
Switzerland 42 1.6 3 1.6
UK 960 37.0 84 44.2
Total 2597 100 190 100
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Results
The results show that private equity investment leads to relatively few changes to indus-
trial relations, and traditional differences between industrial relations systems across 
Europe persist in private equity buyouts. We compare union representation and joint 
regulation in firms before and after the buyout, and report perceptions of the buyout 
process. We address industrial relations issues with respect to union recognition and 
membership; joint regulation of terms and conditions of employment; consultative com-
mittees; and the buyout process.
Trade unions
Private equity buyouts report no significant overall decline in the extent of union recog-
nition compared with before the buyout (Table 2). Just over four-tenths (41%) of respond-
ing firms recognized unions for negotiating pay and conditions of employment before 
the buyout and slightly fewer report this remains the case afterwards (39%), although the 
difference is insignificant (Wilcoxon test). To evaluate whether the private equity impact 
on industrial relations varies according to different social models (Hall and Soskice, 
2001), we group countries as recommended by Hamann and Kelly (2008). Classifying 
industrial relations systems into different groups is difficult but reflects differences in 
union density and structure, collective bargaining coverage and structure, and employ-
ment protection. Liberal Market countries are the UK and Ireland; the group of Northern 
Europe countries is Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden; Central Europe is Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Netherlands and Switzerland; and Mediterranean Europe is France, 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Table 2 shows no changes in the extent of union rec-
ognition in private equity buyouts in both Northern Europe and Mediterranean Europe 
social model contexts; the minor changes in union recognition in liberal markets and 
Central Europe are insignificant. Kruskal-Wallis tests found that the significant differ-
ences in union recognition between social models before buyouts (x2 = 31.56, p = 0.000) 
were present afterwards (x2 = 35.27, p = 0.000).
Managers were asked about attitudes towards union membership before and after 
the buyout, and these were found to change little (Table 2). The majority stated that 
managerial attitudes were neutral towards union membership (58% both before and 
after), a small minority were in favour (8%), with one-third (34%) not in favour. 
Expected differences in attitudes towards unions across social models before buyouts 
(x2 = 26.60, p = 0.000) persist after private equity involvement (x2 = 17.32, p = 0.001). 
Managers in Northern European buyouts remain more in favour of union membership 
than any other social model; firms in liberal markets remain much less in favour. In the 
liberal markets, buyout managers became slightly less in favour of union membership 
under private equity ownership; those in Northern and Central Europe became slightly 
more in favour (Table 2).
The proportion of employees who are union members, approximately one-fifth of 
employees, did not change under private equity ownership compared with the situa-
tion before the buyout (Table 2). Some 11.4 percent of firms report a decline in union 
membership density compared with before the private equity buyout and 10.8 percent 
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Table 2 Trade union recognition, management attitudes to unions, and union membership across social models
 All Liberal markets Northern Europe Central Europe Mediterranean Europe
 Pre-buyout Post-buyout Pre-buyout Post-buyout Pre-buyout Post-buyout Pre-buyout Post-buyout Pre-buyout Post-buyout
Trade union  77 (41.4) 73 (39.2) 17 (20.7) 15 (18.3) 15 (71.4) 15 (71.4) 20 (44.4) 18 (40.0) 25 (65.8) 25 (65.8) 
recognition
Management  
attitudes  
towards union  
membership:
Not in favour 62 (34.1) 62 (34.1) 39 (48.8) 43 (52.8) 4 (19.0) 3 (14.3) 9 (20.5) 8 (18.2) 10 (27.0) 8 (21.6)
Neutral 106 (58.2) 105 (57.7) 38 (47.5) 36 (45.0) 7 (33.3) 9 (42.9) 35 (79.5) 34 (77.3) 26 (70.3) 26 (70.3)
In favour 14 (7.7) 15 (8.2) 3 (3.8) 1 (1.3) 10 (47.6) 9 (42.9) 0 (0) 2 (4.5) 1 (2.7) 3 (8.1)
Trade union  21.5 21.5 9.7 8.6 57.8 56.9 22.4 25.0 22.4 22.2 
membership  
density %
Notes:  Trade union membership density based on 167 responses, with 70 in Liberal Markets, 21 in Northern Europe, 40 in Central Europe and 36 in Mediterranean Europe.
The first row in each cell is the number of respondents and the second row in parentheses is the sample %. 
Only firms providing information before and after the buyout are included in all tables unless otherwise stated.
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Table 3 Average number of issues over which managers would normally negotiate, consult, inform or not inform unions
 All  Liberal markets Northern Europe Central Europe Mediterranean Europe 
 (n = 57) (n = 13) (n = 14) (n = 14) (n = 16)
 Pre-buyout Post-buyout Pre-buyout Post-buyout Pre-buyout Post-buyout Pre-buyout Post-buyout Pre-buyout Post-buyout
Number of issues  
where managers  
negotiate with unions 2.46 2.58 1.92 2.15 2.93 3.07 3.14 3.21 1.88 1.94
Number of issues  
where managers  
consult unions 2.23 2.05 3.0 2.92 2.64 2.50 1.36 1.36 2.0 1.56
Number of issues  
where managers  
inform unions 3.11 3.32 3.23 3.46 2.07 2.36 3.57 3.50 3.50 3.88
Number of issues  
where managers do  
not inform unions  1.21 1.05 0.85 0.46 1.36 1.07 0.93 0.93 1.63 1.63
Note: Average number of issues out of the nine issues in Table 4.
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report increased union membership density. Union presence indicated by whether or 
not a firm had any union members did not change, remaining at 49 percent. The main 
effect of private equity ownership is a slight increase in union density in Central 
Europe. Differences in union membership density reported between social models in 
these firms before buyouts (x2 = 42.28, p = 0.000) persisted after buyouts (x2 = 44.68, 
p = 0.000).
Joint regulation
Managers in buyouts recognizing unions reported whether they normally negotiate, con-
sult, inform or do not inform unions over nine terms and conditions of employment, 
currently under private equity ownership, and whether this occurred before the buyout. 
This comparison indicates whether private equity investment changes the terms and con-
ditions subject to joint regulation in unionized buyouts.
Private equity investment has not changed significantly the number of issues subject 
to joint regulation in unionized firms according to managers (Table 3). On average, in 
firms recognizing unions, both pre- and post-buyout, managers report negotiating over 
two to three issues, consulting unions on two issues, informing unions on three issues, 
and not informing unions on one of the issues asked about. Managers perceive few 
reductions in the number of issues subject to joint regulation in each social model after 
private equity investment. ANOVA tests found the differences between social models in 
the number of issues where managers consult unions (F
(3,62)
 = 3.205, p =.029) had disap-
peared after buyouts (F
(3,58)
 = 2.141, p = .105).
The types of issues subject to joint regulation and the scope of negotiations between 
managers and unions also change little (Table 4). Both before and under private equity 
ownership, in most buyouts recognizing unions, managers report consulting or negotiat-
ing over rates of pay, hours of work, holiday entitlements, grievance and disciplinary 
procedures, and health and safety. Managers usually inform unions about the remaining 
issues; training of employees, staffing plans, pension schemes, and equal opportunities. 
Both union representation and joint regulation continue much as before private equity 
investment according to buyout managers.
Under private equity ownership managers report withdrawing from any ongoing col-
lective agreements in only 4 percent of firms and 10 percent of firms renegotiated any 
ongoing collective agreements before they had expired. Changes to collective agree-
ments were more common in Mediterranean Europe and there was a significant effect of 
social models on renegotiating any ongoing collective agreements before they had 
expired (x2 = 10.11, p = 0.018). Four of the six cases involving withdrawal from a collec-
tive agreement, and eight of the 15 cases concerning renegotiation of a collective agree-
ment before it expired, were in Mediterranean Europe model countries.
Consultative committees
Managers were asked if their firm had any committees in which managers consulted 
employees about general issues (Table 5). The proportion of firms in the whole sample 
reporting consultative committees increased significantly from one half (51%) of the 
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Table 4 Joint regulation of terms and conditions in unionized private equity buyouts (%)
 Rates of pay  Hours of work Holiday entitlements Training of employees
 (n = 67) (n = 68) (n = 66) (n = 67)
 Pre-buyout Post-buyout Pre-buyout Post-buyout Pre-buyout Post-buyout Pre-buyout Post-buyout
Not inform  5 (7.5)  5 (7.5)  4 (6.0)  5 (7.4) 10 (15.6)  9 (13.6) 11 (16.4)  7 (10.4)
Inform 11 (16.4) 10 (14.9) 12 (17.9) 10 (20.6) 17 (26.6) 17 (25.8) 27 (40.3) 32 (47.8)
Consult  5 (7.5)  4 (6.0) 12 (17.9)  4 (13.2)  9 (14.1) 10 (15.2) 25 (37.3) 22 (32.8)
Negotiate 46 (68.7) 48 (71.6) 39 (58.2) 48 (58.8) 28 (43.8) 30 (45.5)  4 (6.0)  6 (9.0)
 Grievance & disciplinary  Staffing plans Pension schemes Equal opportunities Health and safety 
 procedures (n = 67) (n = 65) (n = 64) (n = 65) (n = 67)
 Pre-buyout Post-buyout Pre-buyout Post-buyout Pre-buyout Post-buyout Pre-buyout Post-buyout Pre-buyout Post-buyout
Not inform  7 (10.9)  5 (7.5) 13 (20.0)  8 (12.3) 15 (23.8) 15 (23.4) 14 (21.2) 12 (18.5)  3 (4.5)  2 (3.0)
Inform 22 (34.4) 26 (38.8) 30 (46.2) 34 (52.3) 27 (42.9) 26 (40.6) 24 (36.4) 26 (40.0) 21 (31.3) 22 (32.8)
Consult 15 (23.4) 17 (25.4) 17 (26.2) 18 (27.7) 11 (17.5) 11 (17.2) 22 (33.3) 17 (26.2) 33 (49.3) 35 (52.2)
Negotiate 20 (31.3) 19 (28.4)  5 (7.7)  5 (7.7) 10 (15.9) 12 (18.8)  6 (9.1) 10 (15.4) 10 (14.9)  8 (11.9)
Note: The first row in each cell is the number of respondents and the second row in parentheses is the sample %. 
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sample before private equity ownership to 63 percent after the buyout (Wilcoxon z = 
4.00, p = .000). Private equity purchase did not result in a perceived decline in consulta-
tion committees in any social model, with increases reported in liberal markets (Wilcoxon 
z = 3.30, p = .001), Central (n.s.) and Mediterranean Europe (n.s.). Kruskal-Wallis tests 
found that the significant differences in the presence of any consultation committee 
between social models before buyouts (x2 = 10.38, p = 0.016) disappeared after buyouts. 
A works council at establishment level was most common both before (32%) and after 
(34%) the buyout. The proportion of firms with joint consultative committees at estab-
lishment level increased after the buyout and the proportion with European Works 
Councils (EWC) fell as three firms in Central Europe did not continue with a pre-
existing EWC after the buyout. This probably reflects some buyouts from large multi-
national companies no longer operating in different countries and no longer requiring 
a European Works Council. None of the changes in joint consultative committees, 
establishment works councils, or European Works Councils are statistically signifi-
cant. The significant effect of social models on reports of a works council at establish-
ment level before the buyout (x2 = 10.62, p = 0.014) remained after the buyout (x2 = 
15.03, p = 0.002).
Managers were asked about the influence of consultative committees on managerial 
decisions before and with private equity involvement. Comparing the same firms, man-
agers regard their consultative committees as significantly more influential on manage-
ment decisions under private equity ownership (t = 2.90, p = .005). Over one half of 
managers (56%) rated their committees as not very or not at all influential before the 
buyout, whereas after the buyout 59 percent rate their committees as fairly or very influ-
ential (Table 6). Managers perceive their consultative committees as more influential in 
buyouts in liberal markets (t = 2.03, p = .051) and Central Europe (t = 1.80, p = 0.83). 
ANOVA tests show social models had no significant effect on managers’ perceived influ-
ence of their consultative committees either before (F
(3,89)
 = .922, p = .434) or after buy-
out (F
(3,110)
 = .923, p = .432).
Private equity investment did not change the average number of issues managers 
report discussing in their consultative committees (seven issues on average before 
and after the buyout). However, comparing the issues more likely to be discussed 
before and after private equity investment, managers note a shift under private equity 
ownership in the focus of the issues discussed in consultative committees. More 
managers report significant increases in discussions in their consultative committees 
after the private equity investment only in respect of future plans (Wilcoxon z = 3.61, 
p = .000), production issues (Wilcoxon z = 2.32, p = .020), financial issues (Wilcoxon 
z = 2.31, p = .021) and employment issues (Wilcoxon z = 2.12, p = .034). This does 
not appear to occur at the cost of consultation over employee terms and conditions, 
which managers claim is just as likely to be discussed as before the buyout. Overall, 
managers feel consultative committees under private equity investment have more 
influence on managerial decisions and are more likely to discuss issues directly 
affecting firm performance. Consultation significantly increases only in liberal mar-
kets in respect of future plans (Wilcoxon z = 3.16, p = .002) and employment issues 
(Wilcoxon z = 2.45, p = .014).
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Table 5 Consultation committees pre- and post-buyout (%)
 All Liberal markets Northern Europe Central Europe Mediterranean Europe 
 (n = 187) (n = 85) (n = 21) (n = 44) (n = 37)
 Pre-buyout Post-buyout Pre-buyout Post-buyout Pre-buyout Post-buyout Pre-buyout Post-buyout Pre-buyout Post-buyout
Any 94 (50.3) 117 (62.6)*** 36 (42.4) 50 (58.8)** 15 (71.4) 15 (71.4) 28 (63.6) 32 (72.7) 15 (40.5) 20 (54.1) 
consultation 
committee
A joint  35 (18.4) 40 (21.1) 16 (18.6) 18 (20.9) 6 (28.6) 8 (38.1) 8 (17.8) 7 (15.6) 5 (13.2) 7 (18.4) 
consultative  
committee
A works  61 (32.1) 64 (33.7) 16 (18.6) 17 (19.8) 12 (57.1) 13 (61.9) 23 (51.1)  25 (55.6) 10 (26.3) 9 (23.7) 
council at 
establishment  
level
European   
Works  
Council 22 (11.6) 19 (10.0) 5 (5.8) 5 (5.8) 4 (19) 4 (19) 10 (22.2) 7 (15.6) 3 (7.9) 3 (7.9)
Notes: Respondents could select more than one option therefore the columns add up to more than 100%.
Significance levels: *** p < .001; **p <.01.
The first row in each cell is the number of respondents and the second row in parentheses is the sample %.
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Table 6 The influence of consultation committees pre- and post-buyout
 All Liberal markets Northern Europe Central Europe Mediterranean Europe 
 (n = 86) (n = 32) (n = 13) (n = 27) (n = 14)
 Pre-buyout Post-buyout Pre-buyout Post-buyout Pre-buyout Post-buyout Pre-buyout Post-buyout Pre-buyout Post-buyout
Very  
influential 4 (4.7) 2 (2.3) 3 (9.4) 1 (3.1) 1 (7.7) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (3.7) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Fairly 34 (39.5) 49 (57.0) 9 (28.1) 18 (56.3) 5 (38.5) 7 (53.8) 15 (55.6) 18 (66.7) 5 (35.7) 6 (42.9)
influential
Not very 40 (46.5) 31 (36.0) 16 (50.0) 11 (34.4) 7 (53.8) 6 (46.2) 10 (37.0) 7 (25.9) 7 (50.0) 7 (50.0) 
influential
Not at all 8 (9.3) 4 (4.7) 4 (12.5) 2 (6.3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (7.4) 1 (3.7) 2 (14.3) 1 (7.1) 
influential
Note: The first row in each cell is the number of respondents and the second row in parentheses is the sample %.
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The buyout process
To assess PES calls for ‘trade unions and workers to be consulted and given information 
before a buyout’ (PES Council Adopted Resolution, 2007), we asked whether employee 
representatives were involved in discussions before decisions were taken about a buyout 
or a public announcement made. Some 42 percent of managers report employee repre-
sentatives had been informed but only 9 percent felt representatives had been consulted 
and fewer still (2%) felt representatives had been involved in negotiations (Table 7). In 
the remaining cases (47%), managers did not think employee representatives had been 
informed. Social models had a significant effect on consultation with employee represen-
tatives before buyout (x2 = 14.62, p = 0.002) as employee representatives had not been 
informed about the buyout in the majority of firms in liberal markets.
Where managers claimed to have informed employee representatives, almost half had 
been in firms recognizing unions for negotiating pay and conditions before the buyout. 
Where employee representatives had not been informed, just under a third had been in 
firms recognizing unions for negotiating pay and conditions before the buyout. The 
majority of firms where managers report employee representatives had been consulted or 
involved in negotiations had been unionized before the buyout.
In 65 percent of surveyed companies with union members, managers report unions 
were neutral towards the buyout. In 27 percent of cases, unions were supportive of the 
buyout, while only 8 percent were opposed. In interviews managers explained that 
unions supported private equity investors over rival bids from trade competitors in cases 
where acquisition by competitors threatened to create overlapping capacity and increased 
the threat to jobs, and public ownership in the past had not resulted in the required invest-
ments to build a sustainable business (Table 8).
Across different social models, managers report trade unions were mainly neutral or 
supportive towards private equity buyouts, although more union opposition was reported 
in Mediterranean countries. There was a significant effect of social models on union sup-
port for private equity buyouts (x2 = 19.12, p = 0.000).
Table 7 Consultation with employee representatives during the buyout (%)
Employee  All Liberal  Northern Central Mediterranean 
representatives (n = 183) markets Europe Europe Europe
  (n = 81) (n = 21) (n = 43) (n = 38)
Not informed 86 (47) 48 (59.3) 10 (47.6) 12 (27.9) 16 (42.1)
Informed 76 (41.5) 30 (37.0) 18 (38.1) 22 (51.2) 16 (42.0)
Consulted 17 (9.3) 3 (3.7) 1 (4.8) 8 (18.6) 5 (13.2)
Involved in  4 (2.2) 0 (0) 2 (9.5) 1 (2.3) 1 (2.6) 
negotiations
Note: The first row in each cell is the number of respondents and the second row in parentheses is the 
sample %.
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Insider versus outsider buyouts
Although we fail to find a negative impact of buyouts on industrial relations overall, it is 
possible that outsider buyouts pose a more significant challenge to unions than insider 
buyouts (Bacon et al., 2008). We analysed the subset of 124 outsider buyouts (66%) in 
the sample. Union recognition in outsider buyouts before the change of ownership (49% 
of cases) did not change significantly (47% at the time of the survey), with only two 
cases of derecognition by outsider buyouts and two cases by insider buyouts. Outsider 
buyouts were more likely to recognize unions than insider buyouts, both before and after 
ownership change, with only 29 percent of insider buyouts recognizing unions before the 
buyout and 26 percent recognizing unions afterwards. Management attitudes towards 
union membership did not change in outsider buyouts, with 11 percent in favour, 57 
percent neutral and 32 percent not in favour both before and after buyout.
Outsider buyouts recognizing unions also report an overall increase in the average 
number of issues where they negotiate (to 2.9 from 2.6 before the buyout), consult (2.06 
from 1.98), and inform unions (2.84 from 2.77), and a reduction in the average number 
of issues where managers do not inform unions (1.2 from 1.64). Joint regulation in out-
sider buyouts that recognize unions increases overall on each of the terms and conditions 
listed in Table 4. More outsider buyouts report a consultation committee after the buyout 
(67%) than before (56%), with more reporting a joint consultation committee (47% from 
40%), and proportionately fewer reporting a works council (70% from 74%) or European 
Works Council (23% from 29%). Insider buyouts report an increase in the proportion 
with a consultation committee (56% from 40%), no change in the 42 percent reporting a 
joint consultation committee, 58 percent reporting a works council and little change in 
the proportion reporting a European Works Council (8% before and 9% after buyout). 
The overall influence of consultation committees in outsider buyouts before the buyout 
(5% rating it very influential, 43% fairly influential, 42% not very influential and 11% 
not at all influential) changes little after buyout (none rating it very influential, 54% 
fairly influential, 41% not very influential and 5% not at all influential).
Table 8 Trade union support for private equity buyouts and different social models
 All Liberal Northern Central Mediterranean 
 (n = 181) markets Europe Europe Europe
  (n = 81) (n = 21) (n = 42) (n = 37)
Strongly supported buyout 2 (1.1) 1 (1.2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (2.7)
Supported buyout 15 (8.3) 2 (2.5) 5 (23.8) 5 (11.9) 3 (8.1)
Neither supported nor 40 (22.1) 10 (12.4) 6 (28.6) 13 (31.0) 11 (29.7) 
opposed buyout
Opposed buyout 4 (2.2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (2.4) 3 (8.1)
Strongly opposed buyout 1 (0.6) 1 (1.2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
No trade union involved 119 (65.7) 67 (82.7) 10 (47.6) 23 (54.8) 19 (51.4)
Note: The first row in each cell is the number of respondents and the second row in parentheses is the 
sample %.
 at City University Library on June 17, 2015hum.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
1360  Human Relations 63(9)
Fewer insider buyouts (18%) dealt with unions on buyout, with 13 percent reporting 
unions neither supported nor opposed the buyout, and in 5 percent of cases unions sup-
ported or strongly supported the buyout. More outsider buyouts involved unions, with 
only 4 percent reporting unions opposed or strongly opposed the buyout, with 27 percent 
reporting unions neither supported nor opposed the buyout, and in 12 percent of cases 
unions supported the buyout. We therefore find little evidence that outsider buyouts seek 
to withdraw from joint regulation where it existed before the buyout.
Buyout size
To assess whether industrial relations changes are reported by larger buyouts, we anal-
ysed the 19 buyouts with more than 5000 employees on buyout and 39 buyouts employ-
ing 1001–5000 on buyout. This analysis shows only a single case of union derecognition 
in a firm with more than 5000 employees. Management attitudes towards union member-
ship changed only marginally in buyouts with more than 5000 employees, with three in 
favour, 12 neutral and four not in favour before the buyout, and two in favour, 10 neutral 
and six not in favour after buyout. The 1001–5000 category showed very few changes. 
Union membership density changed little in firms with 1001–5000 employees (24.95% 
before and 24.06% after buyout) and changed little in firms with more than 5000 employ-
ees (16.10% before and 16.50% after buyout).
Buyouts recognizing unions with 1001–5000 employees also report an increase in the 
average number of issues where they negotiate (2.94 from 2.53 pre-buyout), and a reduc-
tion in the average number of issues where managers consult (1.64 from 1.82), inform 
(3.47 from 3.65), and do not inform unions (0.94 from 1.0). The same pattern is reported 
in buyouts recognizing unions with more than 5000 employees, with an increase in the 
average number of issues where managers negotiate (4.09 from 3.75 pre-buyout), and a 
reduction in the average number of issues where managers consult (1.73 from 1.83), 
inform (1.64 from 1.67), and do not inform unions (1.55 from 1.75).
More buyouts with 1001–5000 employees report a consultation committee after the 
buyout (27) than before (20), with more reporting a joint consultation committee 
(11 from 8), a works council (20 from 17), and fewer report a European Works Council 
(3 from 4). Buyouts employing more than 5000 employees reported no changes in the 
presence of committees for consulting employees other than more reporting a European 
Works Council after buyouts (12 from 9). The overall influence of consultation commit-
tees in buyouts employing more than 5000 employees does not change compared with 
before the buyout (10 rating it fairly influential, 5 not very influential and 2 not at all 
influential both before and after buyout). The influence of consultation committees 
increases in buyouts employing 1001–5000 employees, with one case rating it very influ-
ential, eight fairly influential, seven not very influential and three not at all influential 
before the buyout, and after buyout no cases rated it very influential, 16 fairly influential, 
eight not very influential and two not at all influential.
Few larger buyouts negotiated with employee representatives prior to a decision being 
taken or the public announcement of the buyout. Buyouts employing more than 5000 
employees consulted employee representatives in five cases, informed them in seven 
cases and did not inform them in six cases. Unions supported the buyout in four cases, 
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neither supported nor opposed the buyout in nine cases, and in two cases opposed the 
buyout. Among buyouts employing 1001–5000, employee representatives were con-
sulted in three cases, informed in 20 cases, and not informed in 13 cases. Unions sup-
ported the buyout in four cases, neither supported nor opposed the buyout in 12 cases, in 
one case opposed the buyout, and strongly opposed it in one case. We therefore find little 
evidence that larger buyouts seek to withdraw from joint regulation where it existed 
before the buyout.
The effects of leverage
To assess whether changes in industrial relations are reported by buyouts with higher 
leverage, we analysed the subset of 61 UK buyouts with leverage data available. 
Calculating leverage = (Short Term Loans & Overdrafts + Long Term Liabilities)/
Shareholders funds) × 100; we then divide to create two groups (30 with lower leverage 
and 31 with higher leverage) split at the median to account for the small number of deals 
with very high leverage. Higher leveraged buyouts report no changes in union recogni-
tion (nine out of 27) or management attitudes towards union membership (15 neutral and 
12 not in favour) both before and after the buyout, with a slight decline in union member-
ship density from 15.77 percent to 13.32 percent. High leverage buyouts recognizing 
unions also report an increase in the average number of issues where managers negotiate 
(2.00 from 1.89 before the buyout), consult (3.22 from 3.0), and inform (3.47 from 3.65), 
and a reduction in the average number of issues where managers do not inform unions 
(0.67 from 1.22). More high leverage buyouts report a consultation committee after the 
buyout (20) than before (17), and consider the committee very or fairly influential after 
the buyout (12) than before (six). Higher leveraged buyouts also do not display excep-
tional aversion to informing employee representatives before the public announcement 
of the buyout (one consulting, 13 informing and 13 not informing employee representa-
tives), and where recognizing unions, in one case unions strongly supported the buyout, 
in one case they strongly opposed the buyout, and in five cases neither supported nor 
opposed the buyout.
Discussion
To inform the debate on the impact of private equity backed buyouts on industrial rela-
tions in European we have presented the first large-scale survey of managers’ percep-
tions. In relation to the article’s first aim, managers indicate that overall, far from having 
a detrimental effect on union representation (ITUC, 2007; PSE, 2007), private equity 
investment does not result in significant changes to either union recognition, manage-
ment attitudes to union membership, or membership density. Furthermore, managers in 
firms recognizing unions report that the range of issues subject to joint regulation has not 
altered. Under private equity ownership more firms report consultation committees, 
managers regard their consultative committees as more influential on managerial deci-
sions, and more managers report discussing firm performance and future plans. Managers 
in portfolio companies therefore do not perceive the withdrawal from social dialogue and 
collective representation that unions at national and international levels have claimed 
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(Monks, 2007a, 2007b; PSE, 2007). Joint regulation appears to continue with unions 
voicing employee interests to influence management decisions. Given this, it is not sur-
prising that few managers report union opposition to private equity buyouts. These find-
ings suggest that recent criticisms of private equity buyouts drawing on individual cases 
are not representative of the broader experience of buyout managers, and the findings 
across Europe are consistent with previous research findings as the first (Wright et al., 
1984, 1990) and second waves of UK buyouts reported making few changes to industrial 
relations (Bacon et al., 2004; Wright et al., 2009). We also find no evidence that manag-
ers in outsider buyouts or large buyouts seek to withdraw from joint regulation where it 
existed before the buyout.
Our findings, albeit relying on managers’ accounts, reflect several features of private 
equity buyouts that are overlooked by critics of the sector. Unions suggest private equity 
firms are engaged in asset stripping because they are more directly interested in indus-
trial relations than diversified shareholders of public companies, hold firms for only a 
short period, and focus on cost reduction business strategies and firm restructuring rather 
than growth. These assumptions are incorrect in most cases. First, private equity inves-
tors have limited involvement in industrial relations issues according to managers in 
portfolio companies (European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association, 2001). 
HR directors we interviewed reported private equity investor involvement as board 
members approving the business strategy, with investors then ‘generally happy to let the 
business run itself’ as investors ‘will not get involved in details’. This is consistent with 
the fundamental basis of the private equity model being to invest in managers who are 
able to run the business (Gilligan and Wright, 2008).
Second, many private equity firms increase the value of their investments by focusing 
on customer service and developing highly trained and experienced personnel, rather 
than concentrating only on cost reduction. As private equity investors support appropri-
ate investments to build employee skills and commitment (Bacon et al., 2008) we see no 
particular reasons why managers in private equity owned firms cannot work closely on 
these issues with unions. Third, most private equity buyouts are growth cases rather than 
restructuring cases (Meuleman et al., 2009), few involve asset disposals and the mean 
period for holding investments is increasing and around five years (Stromberg, 2008; 
Wright et al., 2007). Most private equity buyouts create jobs, providing scope for posi-
tive industrial relations arrangements to develop (Amess and Wright, 2007). Fourth, pri-
vate equity buyouts may be preferable to the alternative of closure or unwelcome sale to 
a competitor who may have a non-union culture. It was reported to us in a buyout of the 
European division of a manufacturing multinational corporation that the unions preferred 
acquisition by private equity investors that offered a good strategy to develop and invest 
in the business, which had been frustrated under the previous owner, over purchase by an 
American competitor with a strong non-union culture that would have involved further 
downsizing. Relationships with unions were described as ‘very good on the EWC, it was 
good before the buyout and it remains good after the buyout. We are agreed on the way 
forward and remain loyal to each other. We have done as we said.’
Managers in private equity buyouts report increased consultation with employee rep-
resentatives rather than less, and this may reflect attempts to improve firm performance 
by generating employee commitment to the future of the firm. Managers report enhanced 
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consultation with employees on these matters rather than seeking to downgrade 
consultation, or reduce the scope of consultation over other terms and conditions of 
employment. This may reflect a closer alignment between the interests of employee rep-
resentatives and managers as a result of an improved business focus and smaller scale of 
operations. Managers in private equity buyouts may seek to align the goals of employee 
representatives and employees with business aims, develop a closer relationship between 
private equity investors and the firm including its employees, attempt to reduce feelings 
of insecurity arising from a change in ownership, or to build a coalition to improve firm 
performance. The general lack of perceived union opposition to private equity invest-
ment in portfolio companies may have encouraged greater information disclosure from 
managers.
Notice however, that in 47 percent of cases, managers report that employee represen-
tatives had not been informed before the announcement of the buyout decision. Although 
the private equity model is for the running of the business to be the responsibility of 
executives, there may be opportunities for private equity firms to signal their intentions 
more clearly during the buyout, given PES calls for extending to leveraged buyouts the 
Directive obliging employees to be informed and consulted during takeovers. For exam-
ple, in one buyout we interviewed, a divestment from a multinational corporation, pri-
vate equity investors gave a presentation to the different works councils to explain what 
would happen immediately after the buyout. It was reported to us that ‘even though there 
were a lot of tough and critical questions, this created a certain level of trust’. An impor-
tant issue was the length of the investment period and employee representatives were 
assured the investors’ average time to exit was seven years. Investors and the works 
councils met annually after the buyout. In another case, the private equity investors pre-
sented plans to the EWC and to the French works council at the start of the sale ‘to illus-
trate that here is the guy, they are not hiding and they are willing to answer questions’.
In terms of the second aim of the study, comparing industrial relations changes in dif-
ferent social models across Europe, of Watt’s (2008) three possible scenarios, the results 
suggest private equity firms adapt to national systems and traditional national industrial 
relations differences persist. Private equity investments thus appear to represent only a 
limited adaptation of the European social model as suggested by other surveys (Bacon et 
al., 2008). Managers do not perceive private equity as eroding the different approaches 
to labour management across Europe. The persistence of employee voice, indicated by 
continued union representation and joint regulation across social models, suggests that 
private equity investors and managers may not be able to avoid union representatives as 
important channels of communication with employees in unionized firms. Although 
European trade unions fear private equity will spread Anglo-American practices across 
mainland Europe undermining the European social model, buyout managers indicate this 
has not generally occurred. The impact of private equity on industrial relations in Europe 
is shaped by different social models and more appropriately understood through a VoC 
framework (Hall and Thelen, 2008) not as a direct threat to the European social model of 
worker participation (Evans and Habbard, 2008; Vitols, 2008).
Our evidence is consistent with other studies showing that private equity firms adapt 
their use of information in deal assessment across different countries (Wright et al., 
2005). Further, it also suggests that private equity firms may have learnt the importance 
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of understanding different institutional contexts following some of their less than suc-
cessful forays into continental European markets during the first buyout wave of the late 
1980s (Wright et al., 1991, 2006).
We suggest our findings provide important insights to inform the policy debate. The 
findings emphasize the importance of having systematic large-scale evidence rather than 
a small number of atypical cases. The debate has also tended to portray the private equity 
market as focusing on large buy-ins, yet these comprise a very small share of the number 
of deals and tend to be prominent only at market peaks. Our study demonstrates the 
importance of including the full range of buyouts and buy-ins. Policy towards private 
equity continues to evolve. As the European Parliament and European Council discuss 
the proposed Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers with a view to imple-
menting the directive by 2011, our study suggests negative perceptions of private equity 
is at variance with the systematic evidence. Based on our evidence, there does not appear 
to be a case for specific legislation to protect workers’ information and consultation 
rights in private equity buyouts. There appears to be a potential danger that increasing 
compliance costs could delay or reduce private equity investments that would have ben-
eficial effects on enterprises. Our findings do suggest a possible need, bearing in mind 
issues of commercial confidentiality, to introduce a requirement for the provision of 
greater information to employee representatives prior to a buyout. However, this issue 
also seems to apply to other forms of ownership change, not just private equity buyouts. 
More generally, while the Rasmussen proposals have provided a critique of voluntary 
regulation of private equity in the EU, in the light of the credit crisis, claims for greater 
regulation of private equity would appear to be more appropriately part of a general 
approach to regulation across all financial markets (Woolfe, 2009).
As with all studies, this research has a number of limitations that give rise to opportu-
nities for further research. First, our study was restricted to a quantitative approach using 
responses from key HR directors and CEOs. While this provided for empirical generaliz-
ability, further research could also seek responses from private equity firm executives 
and union representatives. For example, while Clark (2009) has undertaken a study of the 
AA buyout from trade union/employee perspectives, there remains a need for rich theory 
building case studies that encompass all parties to the private equity buyout, which could 
juxtapose management’s rationales for employee relations changes with these views. 
There is a need for quantitative studies of employees’ and union perspectives, given the 
problems in generalizing empirically from single cases. Second, we oversampled large 
firms as these are relatively small in number. Industrial relations procedures are gener-
ally more stable in such firms and it may be that our study overemphasizes stability. 
However, these firms have been the main focus of attention regarding changes to indus-
trial relations following private equity investment and we found little evidence that larger 
buyouts seek to withdraw from existing joint regulation.
Third, our respondents, who are part of the new management team in buy-in cases, 
may be more likely to present their industrial relations procedures and processes in a 
positive light. Yet, existing managers in buyout cases may also present changes in a posi-
tive light in order to justify their rationale for the buyout. We are unable to distinguish 
specifically respondents who were present in the enterprises pre-buyout from those intro-
duced on the change in ownership, but we were able to distinguish between insider 
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driven buyouts and outsider driven buy-ins where management change is likely in the 
latter. As our results showed, there was little significant difference between the two and 
little evidence that outsider buyouts seek to withdraw from joint regulation where it 
existed before the buyout.
We visited a selection of firms and our interviews confirmed our pattern of survey 
findings and did not give any particular reasons to be concerned about response bias. Our 
findings are also consistent with previous studies of HR changes in buyouts and buy-ins 
going back some 25 years (Wright et al., 1984).
Fourth, our study was cross-sectional. Although it was designed to allow sufficient 
time after buyout for changes to industrial relations to have occurred, we were unable to 
chart the process of these changes over time. Future research might usefully adopt a 
more longitudinal approach. Although our study was conducted quite recently, it was too 
soon to incorporate the impact of the credit crisis and recession on industrial relations in 
private equity backed buyouts.
Fifth, along with many recent studies of managerial perceptions using mailed ques-
tionnaire surveys, the response rate in this study was quite low. Nevertheless, we were 
able to establish that on a number of criteria, the sample was representative of the popu-
lation of private equity backed buyouts and that the respondents covered a range of dif-
ferences in firm performance and changes in employment relations practices.
Finally, critics might suggest a need for caution in interpreting our results as the study 
was funded directly and indirectly by the private equity industry. We would note that 
CMBOR was established in 1986 at Nottingham University Business School as a not-
for-profit centre to study buyouts in a comprehensive and objective way. That this is 
indeed the case is reflected in CMBOR data, reports and refereed academic papers being 
used by all parties to inform the debate and to support their different perspectives. 
Besides the private equity industry these include, for example: the OECD (Wright et al., 
2007), European Commission (Wright and Bacon, 2009a), Work Foundation (2007),1 
FSA (2006),2  ITUC (Watt, 2008; Wright and Bacon, 2009b), Bank of England, HM 
Treasury, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen (2008), Unite – The Union (Hall, 2007), European 
Federation of Food, Agriculture and Tourism Trade Unions, and sections of the media 
that are either critical (The Guardian, 2007)3  or supportive (Kaletsky, 2007) in respect of 
private equity. The findings presented here are also consistent with early studies funded 
by the UK Economic and Social Research Council (Wright et al., 1984) and studies on 
employment effects (Amess and Wright, 2007a, 2007b) and productivity (Harris et al., 
2005) are consistent with World Economic Forum studies (Davis et al., 2008, 2009).
Conclusions
We have reported the results of the first representative pan-European survey of managers’ 
perceptions of the impact of private equity on industrial relations. Our evidence helps provide 
a more informed understanding of the policy debate regarding industrial relations following 
private equity backed buyouts that has hitherto been missing. In marked contrast to critics’ 
claims, often based on isolated examples, managers report that private equity investment 
overall does not result in changes to union recognition, membership density or changes in 
management attitudes to union membership. Managers in firms recognizing unions after 
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private equity buyouts also do not report reductions in the terms and conditions subject to 
joint regulation. Rather, under private equity ownership more firms report consultative com-
mittees and managers regard these as more influential on their decisions, as well as indicating 
increased consultation over firm performance and future plans. Recent debate has tended to 
imply that the activities of private equity firms represent an important new departure in indus-
trial relations. Yet this evidence from the second wave of private equity buyouts is highly 
consistent with that from the first wave some two decades ago: management recognize the 
continued importance of having formal structures of joint regulation and consultation.
Comparing industrial relations changes in different social models in Europe, we sug-
gest private equity firms adapt to national systems and traditional national industrial 
relations differences persist. Our systematic evidence thus calls into question the argu-
ments that private equity buyouts pose a threat to the European Social Model. Overall, it 
is difficult to escape the conclusion that at least some of the demands for significantly 
enhanced regulation are being driven more by a wider political debate than by the specif-
ics of the private equity context.
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Notes
1 Note that the quantitative data in Work Foundation (2007) and referred to in Treasury Select 
Committee (2007) was provided by CMBOR.
2 Note that deal structuring data in Treasury Select Committee (2007) sourced as FSA is CMBOR 
data.
3 Note that The Guardian leader cites the Work Foundation, which in turn is using CMBOR data, 
and the figure relating to wages is from Amess and Wright (2007a).
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